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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF SECURITIES INFORMATION
PRIOR TO REGISTRATION: THE EFFECT OF CHRIS-CRAFT
INDUS., INC. V. PIPER AIRCRAFT CORP.
In recent years there has been an increasing tendency on the part
of large corporations to publicize information regarding corporate
affairs. This trend reflects growing recognition by the business and
investment communities of the importance of informing the investing
public of anticipated business and financial developments.' Voluntary
public disclosures by corporations have, however, given rise to the
problem of determining under what circumstances such disclosures
violate federally imposed restrictions on publicity involving unregis-
tered or pre-effectively registered securities.' The case of Chris-Craft
Indus. , Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.' is the most recent example of the
difficulties involved in making such a determination. There, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, although affirming the denial of
preliminary injunctive relief to Chris-Craft on other grounds, reversed
the district court's finding that a preregistration press release did not
violate the federal regulations, and remanded the case for a determi-
nation of the proper remedy. The purpose of this comment is to ex-
amine, primarily in light of the Chris-Craft decision, the problems pre-
sented by corporate disclosures involving prefiling publicity and their
relation to the federal securities regulations.
I. FEDERAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
The basic federal disclosure requirements are contained in the
Securities Act of 1933, which is intended to provide "for full and
fair disclosure of the character of the securities sold.'" The pur-
pose of the Act is to insure that prospective investors are informed
of the relevant facts concerning securities offered, and to restore the
confidence of such investors in relation to the selection of sound
securities. 5
The machinery for achieving adequate disclosure is found in the
registration and prospectus requirements of Section 5 of the Act.
Section 5(a) makes it unlawful to sell any security for which a regis-
1 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-3844 (Oct. 8, 1957), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
If 3250, at 3108.
2 Federal securities regulations provide that before any security may be lawfully
offered to the public, a registration statement covering the proposed sale and containing
information regarding the issuer and its securities must be filed with the SEC. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1964). Registration ordinarily becomes effective 20 days after the initial filing.
15 U.S.C. § 77h (1964). Any attempt, either directly or indirectly, to sell a security prior
to registration is strictly forbidden. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e (1964). Sales offers, providing they
are made through the use of an approved prospectus, may be made during the 20-day,
pre-effective waiting period. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, j (1964).
8 Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 92,510, at 98,372 (2d Cir. 1969).
4 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, preamble, 48 Stat. 74.
5 S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
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tration statement is not in effect,° and section 5(b) provides that an
approved prospectus must accompany or precede the sale of any regis-
tered security.? The question whether a prefiling disclosure constitutes
an illegal offer of an unregistered security arises under section 5(c),
which makes solicitations of offers prior to the filing of a registration
statement unlawful. 8
Rule 1359
 of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission) exempts certain types of disclosures made prior to
registration from the requirements of Section 5 of the 1933 Act.
The rule primarily exempts advance notices sent by an issurer to
its stockholders or employees advising them of upcoming securities
offers, as well as notices sent to shareholders of another issuer in-
forming them of an impending exchange offer. However, the rule
stipulates that such notices must state that the offering will be made
only by means of a forthcoming prospectus. In addition, the content
of the notice must be strictly limited to such basic information as the
name of the issuer, the title of the security to be offered, and, in the
case of exchange offers, the title of the security to be surrendered and
the basis upon which the proposed exchange is to be made."
6 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1964) provides:
Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly-
1. to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
2. to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate com-
merce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security
for the purposes of sale or for delivery after sale.
7 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
1. to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit
any prospectus relating to any security with respect to which a regis-
tration statement has been filed under this subchapter, unless such
prospectus meets the requirements of section 77j of this title; or
2. to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate com-
merce any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after
sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a prospectus that meets the
requirements of subsection (a) of section 77j of this title.
Section 77j essentially provides that the prospectus must contain substantially
the same information required in the registration statement.
Section 77b(10) defines a prospectus as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertise-
ment, letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale . ." •
8 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate corn-
tierce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium
of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement
has been filed as to such security... .
Section 77b(10) defines "offer to sell" as "every attempt . . . to dispose of, or
solicitation of an offer to buy, a security . . . ."
9 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1959).
10 Rule 135 provides in part:
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Without the specific exemption provided under rule 135, advance
notices of this type could be treated as illegal prefiIing offers under
section 5(c). This possibility was recognized by a member of the SEC
who stated that "such advance notice.. for this limited purpose [as set
out in rule 135] was permissible under the spirit of the act, if pos-
sibly not under its letter, so long as the content of the notice was
limited to notice and was not embellished with material of a sales
character."" (Emphasis added.)
Apart from the rather limited exceptions under rule 135, the
precise restrictions imposed by section 5(c) on preregistration state-
ments by an issuer remain unclear, both because of the extreme diffi-
culty of drawing definite lines in this area, and because, in the opinion
of at least one expert, of the Commission's reluctance to impede the
tendency toward increased corporate publicity which goes beyond the
statutory limits.'
The SEC has, however, recognized the problem and attempted to
clarify its position. In a 1935 press release the Commission published
the opinion of its general counsel regarding bulletins circulated by
underwriters and dealers. The release stated in part that the "legality
. . . of preliminary information under Section 5 is dependent upon
(a) For the purposes only of Section 5 of the Act, the following notices sent by
an issuer in accordance with the terms and conditions of this rule shall not
be deemed to offer any security for sale:
1. A notice to any class of its security holders advising them that it
proposes to issue to such security holders rights to subscribe to
securities of such issuer;
2. A notice to any class of security holders of such issuer or of an-
other issuer advising them that it proposes to offer its securities
to them in exchange for other securities presently held by such
security holders; or
3. A notice to its employees or to the employees of any affiliate
advising them that it proposes to make an offering of its se-
curities to such employees.
(c) The notice shall state that the offering will be made only by means of a
prospectus . . . and shall contain no more than the following additional
information:
1. The name of the issuer;
2. The title of the securities proposed to be offered; •
3. In the case of a rights offering, the class of securities the holder
of which will be entitled to subscribe to the securities proposed to
be offered, the subscription ratio, the proposed record date, the
approximate date upon which the rights are proposed to be issued,
the proposed term or expiration date of the rights and the ap-
proximate subscription price, or any of the foregoing;
4. In the case of an exchange offering, the name of the issuer and
the title of the securities to be surrendered in exchange for the
securities to be offered, - the basis upon which the exchange is pro-
posed to be made and the period during which the exchange may
be made, or any of the foregoing.
11 Gadsby, Current Problems Under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 and
Release No. 3844, 13 Bus. Law. 358, 363 (1958).
12 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulations, 216 (2d ed. 1961).
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whether or not it is used in connection with or it itself constitutes an
`offer to sell' as that term is defined in the Act.""
In 1957 the SEC issued Securities Act Release No. 33-3844 dealing
with prefiling offerings." The Commission warned that in certain in-
stances publicity and public relations activities might violate the securi-
ties laws. The Commission cited, in particular, the problem raised by
press releases and other similar means of disseminating information
prior to registration which, "although not couched in terms of an ex-
press offer, may in fact, contribute to conditioning the public mind
arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer in
a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is not
in fact part of a selling effort."' The Commission added that this
problem is apparently not generally understood. 1°
The release also presented several hypothetical situations as ex-
amples of the objectionable use of prefiling publicity. In general the
hypotheticals contained in the release presented rather clear instances
in which prefiling publicity was used with the obvious intent of stim-
ulating the public appetite for the securities to be offered. In addition,
the prefiling publicity cited in these examples contained false and
misleading statements or omissions of material fact, which of them-
selves could constitute violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
Securities Act."
One of the examples presented in the release described a situation
where a mining company, prior to the filing of a registration statement
and the public sale of its securities, issued a number of press releases
describing the activities of the company and setting forth optimistic
forecasts of its potential future development. The Commission main-
tained that such advance publicity served to arouse public interest in
the issuer and was, in effect, the initial step in the issuer's selling cam-
paizn. In addition, the forecasts and predictions contained in this
publicity were unreliable and could not have been properly included
in either the registration statement or a prospectus sent to potential
investors." The Commission concluded that such a promotional cam-
13 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-464 (August 19, 1935), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 11 3165, at 3091.
14 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-3844 (Oct. 8, 1957), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
11 3250, at 3108.
15 Id. at if 3254, 3110.
16 Id.
17 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964), which provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
1. to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
2. to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of
a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they are made, not misleading, or
3. to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
18 The information which must appear in the registration statement is of a
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paign constituted an evasion of the section 5 prohibitions against pre-
filing offerings as well as violation of the section 17(a) prohibitions
regarding deceptive and fraudulent practices."
This example as well as others contained in the Commission's
release implies that overly optimistic predictions, glowing generalities
and similar types of statements, although not per se violations of the
preregistration restrictions, can give rise to a strong suspicion that
the preregistration publicity is, in fact, an integral part of the issuer's
selling campaign. Through such unregulated statements an issuer can
more easily stimulate public interest without having to observe the
stringent requirements for specific disclosures found in the registration
and prospectus provisions of the 1933 Act.
It is unfortunate that the SEC's release did not provide any
concrete guidelines for determining the status of prefiling publicity,
except to the extent of giving examples of the most flagrant types of
its misuse. However, a former chairman of the SEC stated that this
omission was justified by the peculiarities of the individual cases.'
Whether a given activity [i.e., preregistration publicity]
would fall within this definition „ [of a proscribed prefiling
offer under section 5(c)] can be determined only by a con-
sideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding a
particular case. Factors such as intent, knowledge and time
would be important considerations. . . . For these reasons the
Commission has never believed it appropriate to attempt to
formulate a rule-of-thumb definition in this area and has
endeavored to deal with the problem on a case-by-case basis 21
The commissioner observed that the primary issue was whether
the material involved constituted a part of the selling effort, and that
such an ultimate determination must be made on an ad hoc basis and
must involve the exercise of judgment in evaluating matters of de-
gree.' He further stated:
A corporation which is planning to bring an issue to market
need not close down its advertising department. . . . But
when shortly before the filing of a registration statement .. .
public communications ... appear which discuss such aspects
factual nature and primarily refers to the financial condition of the issuer, the nature
of its business, a listing of its officers, directors and holders of more than 10% of any
security of the issuer as well as a statement of capitalization of the issuer and any stock
options, existing or to be created. See Securities Act of 1933, Schedule A, 15 § 77aa
(1964). The prospectus must contain essentially all the information appearing in the
registration statement or an approved summary of such information. See Securities Act
of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964).
10 SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-3844 (Oct. 8, 1957), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
3256, at 3111.
20 Gadaby, supra note 11.
21 Id. at 362. These comments were contained in a speech before an investment
association in 1958.
22
 Id. at 368.
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of the business as its finance, its earnings or its growth pros-
pects in glowing and optimistic terms . . . then this raises
a serious question whether the issuer is not, in fact, beginning
the offering of the securities by this means."
It was concluded that the purpose of the release was to publicize the
Commission's views of the type of activity which constitutes a violation
of the statutory prohibitions against prefiling offerings, and to remind
the investment and business communities that the primary responsi-
bility for observing section 5 remains in their hands.24
It appears, therefore, that the basic inquiry into whether a pre-
filing disclosure constitutes an illegal offer necessitates a determination
whether the publicity in question can reasonably be considered as part
of the selling effort." The cases involving preregistration publicity,
however, reflect the difficulty and uncertainty involved in reaching
such a determination.
II. THE PREREGISTRATION DISCLOSURE CASES
In SEC v. Arvida, Corp.28
 the SEC brought an action against
Arvida, Inc., the issuer, and Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co. and
Dominck & Dominck, two underwriting partnerships, for alleged
violations of Section S (c) of the 1933 Securities Act. Arvida, Inc.
was a newly established Delaware corporation which had been formed
for the purpose of developing real estate on Florida's gulf coast. Prior
to the registration and public offering of its securities, Arvida issued
widely circulated press releases announcing the formation of the cor-
poration and its forthcoming plans concerning Florida real estate.
Subsequently, several other press releases were issued by both Arvida
and its underwriters, the co-defendants. The SEC, although ultimately
successful in gaining a final injunction against Arvida, failed in its
efforts to obtain a preliminary injunction against the defendants.'
In ruling against the SEC's motion for a preliminary injunction
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, although
acknowledging that it had no doubt that the publicity had, in fact,
induced many investors to seek out the Arvida stock, stated that it
knew of no case holding that the mere release of information of a
genuine financial interest constituted an offer to sell or a solicitation
of offers to buy.28
However, in the subsequent action for a permanent injunction,
the court found that under the circumstances of the case the defen-
dant's publicity efforts prior to the registration of its securities con-
23 Id. at 362.
24 Id. at 368.
25 Id. at 367-68.
28 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
27 For the opinion of the court refusing to grant a preliminary injunction see SEC
v. Arvida Corp. [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. If 90,883 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
28 Id.
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stituted an unlawful offer to sell such securities within the meaning
of section 5(c) 29 Despite the court's finding of good faith on the part
of the defendants, it granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the
further solicitation of offers of Arvida securities until a registration
statement was filed."
In In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co.," a companion case
against the underwriters of the Arvida securities, the Commission
further clarified its position regarding prefiling publicity. The press
releases issued by these firms in connection with the proposed distri-
bution of Arvida stock were found to be in violation of section 5(c),
and the underwriters were given a reprimand for such improper prac-
tices. In its decision the Commission stated:
Since it is unlawful under the statute . . . to sell or buy a
security . . . prior to the filing of a registration statement,
[those] who are to participate in a distribution likewise risk
the possibility that the employment by them of public media
of communication to give publicity to a forthcoming offering
prior to the filing of a registration statement constitutes a
premature sales activity prohibited by Section 5(c).. . . 82
The Commission had little difficulty finding that the publicity was
calculated to arouse and stimulate investor interest in Arvida securi-
ties. The Commission also found that the preregistration publicity
contained misleading statements and omissions of financial facts es-
sential to an intelligent investment decision. 33 The Commission re-
jected the underwriters' claim that the publicity was "news," stating
that section 5 (c) was "equally applicable whether or not the issuer
has . . . or by astute public relations activities may be made to appear
to have, news value." 34 The Commission emphasized that the danger to
investors from publicity amounting to a selling effort may be greater
in the case where the issuer has "news value" since it may then be
easier to whip up a "speculative frenzy." 33
 The Commission con-
cluded that the issues involved were basic to the principles of the
Securities Act of 1933, because to allow investment decisions to be
formulated on the basis of unregulated prefiling publicity would make
compliance with the registration requirements little more than a
meaningless formality."
29 SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
80 Id.
31 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959)
82 Id. at 851.
83 Id. at 853.
84 Id. at 852. In this regard the Commission further stated, "Our interpretation
of Section 5(c) in no way restricts the freedom of news media to seek out and publish
financial news. Reporters presumably have no securities to sell ... and Section 5(c)
has no application to them." Underwriters and issuers are in a different position, how-
ever, because "they are in the business of distributing securities, not news." Id. at 852 n.17.
85 Id. at 853.
36 Id. It is apparent that in the Arvida controversy the SEC's objections to what it
termed prefiling offerings of securities were reinforced by a finding that such public-
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II. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.
In Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 37 Chris-Craft
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent a rival company, Bangor
Punta, Inc., from retaining several thousand shares of Piper Aircraft
securities obtained in an exchange with Piper stockholders." Chris-
Craft claimed that a press release announcing Bangor Punta's
proposed exchange offer had violated the Federal prohibitions against
prefiling offerings. The case arose out of the competing efforts of
Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta to gain effective control of Piper Air-
craft.
A. The Struggle for Control of Piper Aircraft
In January of 1969 Chris-Craft began acquiring shares of Piper
Aircraft on the open market. Later in the month Chris-Craft publically
announced an interest in Piper and made a public tender offer for up
to 300,000 shares of Piper stock. Piper's management, however,
viewed the prospects of a merger with Chris-Craft as against the best
interests of the company and it was decided to resist the takeover
attempt. Letters were sent to all Piper shareholders advising them not
to respond to the tender offer.
Piper took other measures to frustrate the efforts of Chris-Craft.
Its board of directors approved an agreement with Grumman Air-
craft & Engineering Corp. by which Piper agreed to sell 300,000
authorized but unissued shares to Grumman. This sale it was hoped
would lay the groundwork for an eventual merger between the two air-
craft manufacturers. Although this agreement was never, in fact, con-
summated, the publicity surrounding these negotiations did have an
adverse effect on the Chris-Craft tender offer." Chris-Craft then filed a
registration statement and prospectus with the SEC in which it pro-
posed to offer certain of its securities in return for shares of Piper stock.
ity contained misleading and material omissions which were not consistent with the
full disclosure requirements of the securities laws. See also In re First Maine Corp.,
38 S.E.C. 882 (1959), in which the underwriters of a life insurance company were
suspended for 20 days for offering unregistered securities through prefiling publicity.
As in the Loeb case, the Commission found that the publicity was primarily aimed at
stimulating investor interest and, in addition, was misleading in its general tenor.
37 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
39 Id. at 193. In this action Chris-Craft also sought to restrain Bangor Punta from
acquiring additional shares of Piper, to prevent the merger of the two companies, and
to prevent Bangor Punta from voting 120,000 additional shares of Piper purchased
during the period immediately preceding the filing of a registration statement covering
its proposed exchange offer. Id. See Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. IF 92,510, at 98,373
(2d Cir. 1964).
39 Piper also issued 469,199 shares of its authorized but unissued stock to acquire
control of two other corporations, a Florida construction firm and a closely-held
Louisiana corporation. However, the Board of Governors of the New York Stock
Exchange held that the distribution of nearly 30% of Piper's stock violated the Ex-
change's listing criteria and, consequently, the transactions were rescinded. 303 F. Supp.
at 193.
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The First Boston Corp., the financial advisor to Piper, then began
holding preliminary talks with Bangor Punta regarding the possibility
of a merger between Piper and Bangor Punta, and a tentative agree-
ment was reached." While the negotiations between Bangor Punta
and Piper progressed, Chris-Craft publically announced the terms of
its pending registration statement which proposed an exchange offer
of Piper stock for Chris-Craft stock.
On the day following this announcement, Piper and Bangor Punta
issued a joint press release stating that a final merger agreement had
been reached between the two companies." Included in the press re-
lease was the following paragraph which was the basis for the sub-
sequent attack by Chris-Craft:
Bangor Punta has agreed to file a registration statement
with the SEC covering a proposed exchange offer for any and
all remaining outstanding shares of Piper Aircraft for a pack-
age of Bangor Punta securities to be valued in the judgment of
the First Boston Corp. at not less than $80 per Piper share.
The registration statement covering all securities to be issued
will be filed as soon as possible and a meeting of the share-
holders of Bangor Punta will be called for approval."
As a result of the subsequent exchange offer, Bangor Punta obtained
107,574 shares of Piper stock. This acquisition brought Bangor Punta's
total holdings in Piper to 44 percent of the outstanding shares. Chris-
Craft had succeeded in capturing nearly 40 percent of the outstanding
Piper stock. However, 259,026 shares of Piper remained in the hands of
40 Bangor Punta was reluctant to undertake such a merger unless the Piper
family's 501,090 shares of Piper stock, approximately 1/3 of the corporation's out-
standing stock, was sold to Bangor Punta. The Piper family eventually accepted this
precondition on April 22, 1969. Id. at 191.
41 The agreement provided for the exchange of the Piper family's stock for
specified Bangor Punta securities and a pledge by Bangor Punta to use its best efforts
to acquire more than 50% of the Piper stock. Bangor Punta also agreed to make
an exchange offer to all other Piper stockholders under which such stockholders would
be entitled to exchange their securities for Bangor Punta securities and/or cash having
a value, in the written opinion of the First Boston Corp., of $80 or more. Id. at 194.
42 SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. f 92,428, at 98,022
(1969). The press release also stated in part:
Bangor Punta Corporation and the Piper family have reached an agreement
whereby Bangor Punta will acquire the Piper family's more than 500,000 share
interest in Piper Aircraft Corporation. William T. Piper Jr., who is President
of Piper Aircraft, and David W. Wallace, Chief Executive of Bangor Punta,
jointly announced the agreement and said they regarded the agreement as a
first step in a proposed consolidation of the two companies. . . . Mr. Piper said
that in view of Bangor Punta's long-standing policy of maintaining autonomy
in management of its operating companies and the similarity of operating
philosophies between the two companies, he and the Piper family would
strongly support the merger and would recommend it to all shareholders.
. . . Sales of the combined companies would reach $450,000,000 in fiscal 1969,
with approximately $180,000,000, or 40 percent in the aircraft, recreational
and leisure time fields.
Id.
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private investors and, consequently, neither company succeeded in
gaining effective control.
Following the issuance of the joint press release," the SEC insti-
tuted an action against both Bangor Punta and Piper, maintaining
that the press release, in announcing the offer and in setting forth a
specific value for the Bangor Punta securities to be offered, con-
stituted an effort by the defendants to induce investors to purchase
Bangor Punta securities prior to the filing of a registration statement
in violation of section 5 (c) and rule 135. The Commission contended
that the absence of a registration statement covering precise informa-
tion regarding the securities being offered had the effect of depriving
the shareholders of Piper as well as other interested investors of an
opportunity to make an informed decision concerning the merits of
the offering." Without admitting any of the allegations contained in
the complaint, Bangor Punta and Piper consented to the entry of a
permanent injunction enjoining them from selling or offering for sale
either of their securities until a registration statement was filed with
the SEC.44 Bangor Punta thereafter filed a registration statement.
B. The Suit by Chris-Craft
Chris-Craft brought an action against Bangor Punta for a per-
manent injunction alleging that Bangor Punta had unfairly acquired
Piper securities through violations of the federal securities laws, and
should therefore be forced to divest itself of its holdings in Piper.
Chris-Craft also entered a claim for $45 million in damages based on
Bangor Punta's allegedly illegal conduct in its dealings with Piper.
Bangor Punta responded with a countersuit against Chris-Craft for
$50 million in damages. While these actions were pending, Chris-Craft
sought a preliminary injunction against Bangor Punta to prevent the
latter from accepting or retaining the 107,574 shares of Piper stock
obtained pursuant to Bangor Punta's General Exchange Offer of July
18, 1969.
In this action Chris-Craft contended that the press release con-
stituted "gun-jumping"—a prefiling offering of unregistered securi-
ties in violation of Section 5(c) of the Securities Act and Rule 135. It
maintained that the publicity had induced many stockholders to accept
the exchange offer prior to the filing of a registration statement, and
urged that such stockholders be given an opportunity to rescind their
tenders once a "full and fair disclosure" of the Bangor Punta ex-
change offer had been made."
The District Court for the Southern District of New York,
however, rejected these contentions, finding that the press release
was not a prefiling offer in violation of section 5(c) or rule
135. Rather, the court concluded that the release was a timely dis-
closure which served to preclude the possibility of any stock manip-
45 Id. Q 92,428, at 98,023.
44 Id. g 92,428, at 98,025.
45 303 F. Supp. 191, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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ulations or unfair dealings in Piper stock." Moreover, the court stated
that the release was entirely consistent with, if not required by, the
New York Stock Exchange guidelines for corporate disclosures,"
which provide that where negotiations leading to mergers and other
major corporate reorganizations reach a point where the issues in-
volved- can no longer be kept strictly confidential, then "fairness re-
quires that the company make an immediate public announcement.... 7;48
The court found that Bangor Punta and Piper had reached such a
stage in their negotiations, and that public disclosure was, therefore,
required in order to prevent any unfair dealings in Piper stock." In
support of its position that the press release did not constitute an offer
to sell securities and therefore was not in violation of the prefiling
restrictions," the court cited rule 135, apparently finding that the
release was exempt thereunder since it contained information regarding
a proposed exchange offer."
Chris-Craft also claimed that the press release was misleading
because it implied that the Bangor Punta securities to be exchanged
for each share of Piper would be immediately resalable at $80." The
court rejected this contention, stating that full disclosure called for
"public statements .. . definite as to price,"" and that rule 135 re-
quired a disclosure of the basis of the proposed exchange. The court
observed that the statements contained in the release were not mis-
leading because they did not imply that such a value would endure
for the duration of the exchange offer and "the vagaries of the market-
place belie such a construction.""
In denying Chris-Craft's motion for a preliminary injunction, the
court held that the plaintiff had failed to show that it would suffer
irreparable damage, or that any of the stockholders who tendered their
shares would not have done so if the alleged violation had not oc-
curred." Thus, the court concluded that the equities of the case
appeared to speak against the issuance of a preliminary injunction."
On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that the preliminary injunction sought by Chris-Craft
46
 Id. at 195.
47 Id. at 195, 196.
49 Id. at 196.
49 The court felt that the disclosure of the proposed valuation was especially war-
ranted by the fact that the $80 figure was substantially above the current market price
of Piper stock. Id. at 195.
50 Id. at 191.
51 Notices permitted to be sent under rule 135 and which comply with the terms
and conditions of the rule "shall not be deemed to offer any security for sale." Id. at 196.
52 Chris-Craft claimed that as such it constituted violations of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9, 10(b), 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, j(b), n(e) (1964).
53 303 F. Supp. at 196.
54 Id. at 197. In addition, the court observed that Bangor Punta's final prospectus
contained statements disavowing any guarantees or representations as to the value of
the securities involved in its exchange offer. Id.
55 Id. at 199.
60 Id.
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had been properly denied, since there had been no showing of the
necessary threat of irreparable damage. However, the appellate court,
with one judge dissenting, reversed the lower court's findings as to the
non-selling character of the press release, holding that the categories
of information permitted to be contained in prefiling disclosures under
rule 135 were exclusive, and that the rule did not authorize any refer-
ence to the value of the proposed offering." The court concluded,
therefore, that by setting forth in a release a specific valuation of $80,
Bangor Punta had gone beyond the permissible scope of the rule and
had, in effect, made an unlawful prefiling offer. 58
 The court rejected
Bangor Punta's claim that a disclosure of specific valuation was com-
pelled in this case, even prior to registration, both by SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co." and by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange.
The court found that the only material fact, as defined by Texas Gulf
Sulphur,°° required to be disclosed was Bangor Punta's commitment
to offer its securities for those of Piper, and that rule 135 adequately
provides for this type of announcement." In regard to the contention
that an immediate and complete disclosure was required under the
New York Stock Exchange guidelines, the court observed that al-
though the guidelines were entitled to considerable respect, they could
not bind the Commission or the court, and that
to hold that a diclosure would be privileged here because the
$80 value could not be kept secret and might affect the
market would mean that many other companies could offer
to sell securities before their registration by claiming that the
terms of the proposed offer could not be kept totally secret
and must therefore be disclosed in full."
As a result of its finding that the press release was, in fact, an
offer to sell in violation of section 5(c), the appellate court remanded
the case for consideration of a suitable remedy."
C. Analysis of the Chris-Craft Opinions
The appellate court's holding in regard to the press release would
appear to be based on a closely reasoned interpretation of both the
meaning and intent of rule 135, whereas the district court's deter-
mination that the release was an exempted prefiling disclosure under
that rule can be challenged on many grounds. Section C of rule 135,
for example, provides that all prefiling notices must state that the
67
 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
V 92.510, at 98,376 (2d Cir. 1969).
68 Id.
59 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
60
 Id. at 849.
61
 Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. l[ 92,510, at 98,377 (2d Cir. 1969).
62 Id.
63
 Id. The appellate court also found that Bangor Punta had made unlawful pur-
chases of Piper stock during the tenure of its exchange offer and remanded the case
for further proceedings on this issue. Id. 11 92,510, at 98,378.
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forthcoming offering will be made only by means of a prospectus."
No such statement was contained in the press release. This mandatory
provision would seem to be essential to the basic purpose of the rule
of permitting brief, preregistration announcements of certain proposed
offerings. The requirement that a notice, to be exempt, state that the
offering will be made by a prospectus serves to reinforce its non-offer-
ing nature by reminding the potential investor that a more specific
discussion of the proposed offering will be made available.
Rule 135 also provides that notices must contain only the in-
formation explicitly permitted under the provisions of the rule." The
press release, however, contained information which was not acceptable
under the specific terms of the rule, including sales projections of the
combined operations of the two companies, a mutual endorsement of
the agreement by the respective managements of Piper and Bangor
Punta, and an expression of support of the proposed merger by the
Piper family, the leading shareholder in Piper Aircraft. Since these
statements are not allowed by rule 135 because they are not therein
specifically provided for, they may be construed as attempts to induce
sales and thus would be prohibited by section 5(c). The appellate
court recognized that an announcement which furnished attractive
descriptions of both the securities to be offered and the issuer con-
tained sufficient information to constitute an offer rather than a pre-
filing notice."
Section C of rule 135 allows notices of proposed exchange offer-
ings to state the basis upon which the exchange is proposed." It is
submitted, however, that this does not permit an issuer to place a
specific valuation on the securities to be exchanged as was done in the
Bangor Punta press release. If, as previously discussed, the purpose of
rule 135 is to allow an issuer to send brief, prefiling announcements to
certain stockholders, then it is clearly inconsistent to allow a specific
valuation to be included in such an announcement. It would be more
reasonable to interpret this section of the rule as providing for no more
than a general description of the basis of the proposed exchange, that
is, a description of the basic ratio of exchange between the stock being
offered and the stock which is being sought. This interpretation is con-
sistent with the appellate court's determination that rule 135 did not
provide for a disclosure of the specific value of the offered shares."
The district court's implication that the average knowledgeable in-
vestor, one familiar with "the vagaries of the marketplace," would
not have been misled by the press release is also of questionable valid-
ity. The court of appeals, however, recognizing that the purpose of
section 5 and rule 135 is to protect the unwary and inexperienced
64 See note 10 supra.
65 17 C.F.R. § 230.135(c) (1959).
66 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
If 92,510, at 98,376 (2d Cir. 1969).
67 See note 10 supra.
68 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., Current CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
¶ 92,510, at 98,377 (2d Cir. 1969).
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buyer, termed the valuation "potentially misleading" to the extent that
some persons would probably construe the $80 figure as referring to
market value.69
Regardless, however, of the holding as to the misleading quality
of the statements, such a finding would not be determinitive as to
whether that same publicity constituted a premature selling effort.
Thus, the inclusion of specific valuation, whether deemed actually mis-
leading or not, as well as the other information in the release could
justifiably be construed, as they were by both the SEC, in its
action against Piper and Bangor Punta, and the appellate court in
Chris-Craft, as amounting to items of a sales nature and, consequently,
per se a violation of Section 5(c) of the Securities Act.
Thus, in Chris-Craft the appellate court recognized that not all
information purportedly classed under the heading of "public dis-
closures" is per se exempt from the other restrictions of the securities
laws. The court, in effect, realized that to permit information of a sales
character to reach the public prior to registration under the guise of a
timely disclosure would frustrate the policy of the securities regula-
tions." To this end the appellate court strictly interpreted rule 135,
holding it to be the exclusive guideline governing the amount of in-
formation which may be properly disclosed prior to registration.
Doubtless the line drawing between an announcement con-
taining sufficient information to constitute an offer and one
which does not must be to some extent arbitrary. A checklist
of features that may be included in an announcement which
does not also constitute an offer to sell serves to guide the
financial community and the courts far better than any judi-
cially formulated "rule of reason" as to what is or is not an
offer. Rule 135 provides just such a checklist, and if the Rule
is not construed as setting forth an exclusive list, then much
of its value as a guide is lost."
Moreover, under the district court's interpretation of rule 135 it would
appear far too easy for an issuer to initiate its selling campaign by
means of prefiling publicity.
CONCLUSION
With the widespread use of corporate publicity in today's business
world, it is inevitable that close and difficult cases will arise as to
whether prefiling publicity amounts to an illegal offer to sell unregis-
tered securities. The appellate court's opinion in Chris-Craft, however,
gives a clearer insight into the important role of rule 135 in regard to
prefiling disclosures, and reaffirms the SEC's position that no more
than a minimum of information should be contained in such prefiling
advance notices. The appellate court also recognized the need for close
69 Id. IT 92,510, at 98,376.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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scrutiny of prefiling disclosures in order to prevent an abuse or cir-
cumvention of the prefiling requirements contained in the Securities
Act of 1933.72
THOMAS W. RUGGIERO
72
 In its continuing efforts to establish more clearly defined standards in this area
the SEC has recommended certain broadening amendments to rule 135. See SEC
Security Act Release No. 33-5010 (Oct. 7, 1969), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 3012, at 3053.
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